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1281 
HOW THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 
STANDARD COULD UNDERMINE THE VALIDITY 
OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS 
There is hardly anything objectionable about a statute that allows a 
state to convict an individual of a crime, imprison him
1
 for a fixed term, 
and release him after he has served his sentence. However, many people‘s 
sense of fairness and justice would be offended by a statute that—rather 
than releasing him from prison at the end of his criminal sentence—
allowed the state to try him civilly on essentially the same facts and 
involuntarily confine him for an indefinite period. Although such a 
procedure is generally atypical in American law, in the context of sexually 
violent predators,
2
 a significant number of states have adopted just such a 
scheme.
3
  
Sexually violent crimes garner a unique fear and disgust in the public‘s 
mind.
4
 Rather than releasing this particular type of criminal back into the 
community, many state legislatures have found it a prudent and politically 
popular choice
5
 to extend these individuals‘ confinement beyond their 
 
 
 1. Masculine pronouns will be used throughout this Note when generically describing sexually 
violent predators (SVPs). Female sex offenders account for only ―a very tiny proportion of the 
population of sex offenders.‖ Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, What we Know and Don’t Know 
About Treating Adult Sex Offenders, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS 
OFFENDERS 101, 101 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond eds., 2003). People found to be SVPs are 
overwhelmingly male. See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex 
Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, §1, at 1. This can make commitments for females 
difficult to obtain because of the lack of data regarding the likelihood of women reoffending. See 
Allison Retka, I’m Going to Die Here, MO. LAWYER‘S WEEKLY, June 12, 2009, at 14. 
 2. See infra note 33. 
 3. See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (observing that confining sexually violent offenders 
―beyond their prison terms‖ is a ―growing national movement‖); see also infra note 28.  
 4. See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (citing ―public fury over grisly sex crimes‖). See 
generally PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN 
MODERN AMERICA (1998).  
 5. These statutes are sometimes born out of egregious crimes that receive significant media 
coverage, generating public outcry. See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (stating that these 
programs are ―[b]orn out of the anguish that followed a handful of high-profile sex crimes in the 
1980s‖). See generally JENKINS, supra note 4. This phenomenon appears to have been the genesis of 
the Washington state statute. In the early 1980s, Washington ―reformed the state‘s criminal sentencing 
framework‖ to homogenize sentencing guidelines and eliminate parole. Roxanne Lieb, State Policy 
Perspectives on Sexual Predator Laws, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS 
OFFENDERS, supra note 1, at 41, 42. In the late 1980s, a convict was released after a ten-year sentence 
despite serious concerns that he would reoffend. Id. at 43. ―Two years after his release he raped[,] . . . 
strangled[, and disfigured] a seven-year-old boy,‖ leaving him to die. Id. ―[P]ublic outcry over these 
crimes‖ led to a series of executive and legislative maneuvers, which determined that increased 
criminal sentences were insufficient. Id. Subsequent decisions culminated in the state‘s sexually 
violent predator statute. Id. at 43–44. Additionally, many politicians have evidently found these laws 
politically attractive. See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (noting that ―the laws are proven and 
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criminal sentences through the use of the civil system.
6
 The rationalization 
for this policy choice rests on the murky nexus between the provinces of 
law and psychology.
7
 Sexually violent predators are believed to have a 
mental abnormality that increases their likelihood of recommitting a 
sexually violent crime.
8
 Confinement, therefore, has the twin aim of 
protecting the public from this higher level of danger and providing 
treatment to the individuals to help them overcome the mental abnormality 
on which their confinement is based.
9
 Under most such statutes, the 
individual‘s chances of being released from the civil commitment rest on 
his ability or inability to overcome his mental abnormality through 
treatment.
10
 
Despite these compelling public policy concerns, such statutes have 
been the subject of numerous constitutional challenges and scholarly 
criticism.
11
 Although litigants have tested the constitutional validity of 
these statutes under a variety of theories,
12
 the crucial determination has 
almost invariably been whether the statute is criminal or civil.
13
 Courts 
look beyond the statutory label to determine whether it is punitive in 
purpose or effect, which would transform the nominally civil statute into a 
criminal one.
14
 In determining whether the statute is punitive in purpose or 
 
 
potent vote-getters,‖ and that despite their lack of success, ―political leaders . . . are vastly expanding 
such programs‖). It appears that some political actors find that sexually violent predators are an ideal 
target for grandstanding. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 385 (1997) (citing the testimony of a 
Kansas task force member, ―[T]his Bill may mean a life sentence for a felon that is considered a risk to 
women and children. SO BE IT!‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 6. See infra note 28. 
 7. For discussions of the intersection of psychology and criminal law in risk assessment, see 
generally R. Karl Hanson, Who is Dangerous and When are They Safe? Risk Assessment with Sexual 
Offenders, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, supra note 1, at 63, 
and Roy B. Lacoursiere, Evaluating Offenders Under a Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Practical 
Practice, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, supra note 1, at 75.  
 8. See Lacoursiere, supra note 7, at 75. 
 9. See, for example, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2005), which states: 
The legislature finds that . . . sexually violent predators . . . are likely to engage in repeat acts 
of sexual violence if not treated for their mental abnormality. . . . [T]he existing civil 
commitment procedures . . . are inadequate to address the special needs of sexually violent 
predators and the risks they present to society. . . . [T]he potentially long-term control, care 
and treatment of sexually violent predators is necessary. 
Id. See also Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (describing the ―dichotomy at the core of 
[commitment centers‘] stated reason‖ for being detained: ―to lock away dangerous men . . . but also to 
treat them.‖). 
 10. The efficacy of treatment, however, is the subject of ongoing debate. See infra note 126 and 
accompanying text.  
 11. See infra Parts II, III.  
 12. See infra note 55.  
 13. See infra notes 63, 79, 104 and accompanying text.  
 14. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986). 
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effect, Supreme Court precedent has relied heavily upon the statutory 
provision of treatment.
15
 The provision of treatment is important for the 
constitutional validity of the statute because its purported purpose is to 
protect the public while the individual is treated for his mental 
abnormality; the purpose cannot be to punish the individual, at least not 
without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.
16
 If the state fails to provide 
any treatment for the individual‘s mental abnormality, the prospect of 
recovery and release is practically impossible.
17
 Indefinite physical 
confinement with practically no chance of release would certainly raise 
questions as to whether the statute had a punitive purpose or effect. In 
short, to support the constitutionality of these civil commitments, the 
statutory provision of treatment really ties the scheme together.  
But what if a state provided insufficient or ―‗sham treatment . . . that 
lasts for years, ostensibly to change someone‘s psychiatric diagnosis,‘‖ 18 
with the true purpose of prolonging his confinement? Such a scenario 
would likely be difficult to detect, in part because of the ongoing debate as 
to whether these individuals are amenable to treatment at all.
19
 When a 
confined individual alleges that the state has impinged on his 
constitutional rights, the proper guardian of his rights ought to be the 
federal courts rather than the state.
20
 In the context of sexually violent 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 369–70 (―We are unpersuaded by petitioner's efforts to challenge [the] 
conclusion [that the statute is civil]. Under the Act, the State has a statutory obligation to provide ‗care 
and treatment for [persons adjudged sexually dangerous] designed to effect recovery . . . .‘‖). 
 16. See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 269 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―The short of 
the matter is that, for Double Jeopardy . . . purposes, the question of criminal penalty vel non depends 
upon the intent of the legislature . . . .‖). There seems to be widespread agreement that SVPs‘ 
confinement must not be like confinement in prison. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 373 (―Had petitioner 
shown . . . that the confinement of such persons imposes on them a regimen which is essentially 
identical to that imposed upon felons with no need for psychiatric care, this might well be a different 
case.‖); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982) (noting in the context of an involuntarily 
committed mentally retarded individual that ―[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions 
of confinement are designed to punish‖); Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil 
Commitment and the Requirement of Adequate Treatment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1383, 1401 (2008) 
(applying Youngberg to the sexually violent predator context). The notion that confinement under an 
SVP statute must not amount to a prison-like confinement stands in stark contradiction to the realities 
observed at some such facilities. See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (―Most of the centers tend to 
look and feel like prisons, with clanking double doors, guard stations, fluorescent lighting, cinder-
block walls, overcrowded conditions and tall fences with razor wire around the perimeters. Bedroom 
doors are often locked at night, and mail is searched by the staff for pornography or retail catalogs with 
pictures of women or children. Most states put their centers in isolated areas. Washington State‘s is on 
an island three miles offshore in Puget Sound.‖).  
 17. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 18. Retka, supra note 1 (quoting Dr. Delaney Dean). 
 19. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.  
 20. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) (―But the error from which these 
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predators, however, the courts have adopted the professional judgment 
standard, which presumes that the treatment decisions of a qualified 
mental health professional are valid unless they substantially depart from 
generally accepted norms.
21
 Because the generally accepted norms for 
treating sexually violent predators are ill defined,
22
 courts lack a principled 
metric with which to apply the standard. By continuing to adhere to a 
standard that the courts cannot apply in practice, they are abdicating their 
role as the protector of individual rights. 
Part I of this Note will explore some common features shared by 
different states‘ statutory schemes for the involuntary commitment of 
sexually violent predators. Part II will analyze several Supreme Court 
cases that shed some light on how the treatment that is provided to 
sexually violent predators may affect the constitutionality of their 
confinement. Part III explains what is meant by ―treatment‖ for sexually 
violent predators and then explores the propriety and consequences of the 
professional judgment standard as a method for evaluating challenges to 
treatment. Part IV analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of alternative 
options for addressing the difficulties of providing treatment. This Note 
concludes with a brief overview of the purpose of the statutes, the 
problems that have arisen that threaten to undermine such statutes, and a 
suggestion of how to adjust the jurisprudence to better serve principles of 
justice without sacrificing public safety. 
I. THE MODERN STATUTORY SCHEME FOR THE INVOLUNTARY CIVIL 
COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS 
The law has treated sexually violent criminals as a uniquely dangerous 
class of criminals for much of the twentieth century.
23
 Sexual crimes, 
especially violent sexual crimes against women and children, are often 
seen as more egregious than other crimes.
24
 Because these criminals are 
thought to engage in violent sexual acts compulsively,
25
 it follows that 
 
 
petitioners suffered was a denial of rights . . . rooted in the Bill of Rights, offered and championed in 
the Congress by James Madison, who told the Congress that the ‗independent‘ federal courts would be 
the ‗guardians of those rights.‘ . . . With faithfulness to the constitutional union of the States, we 
cannot leave to the States the formulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to 
protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 21. See infra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 125, 139–40.  
 23. See generally JENKINS, supra note 4. 
 24. See id. at ch. 3. 
 25. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360, 375 (1997) (noting an ―admitted lack of 
volitional control‖ and ―serious, and highly unusual inability to control his actions‖). 
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they would be less likely to be deterred by the possibility of incarceration
26
 
and more likely to reoffend upon release. To protect society from the 
possibility of these individuals reoffending when released from prison, 
states have attempted to detain them through a variety of civil commitment 
statutes over the past century.
27
  
Many states now have statutory schemes that allow for the indefinite 
and involuntary civil commitment of people found to be sexually violent 
predators (SVPs).
28
 Although there is significant variation between the 
state statutes,
29
 many of them are ―strikingly similar.‖30 These statutes31 
operate only after an individual has been convicted of a sexually violent 
 
 
 26. Id. at 362–63 (―[Sexually violent offenders] are, by definition, suffering from a ‗mental 
abnormality‘ or a ‗personality disorder‘ that prevents them from exercising adequate control over their 
behavior. Such persons are therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement.‖). 
 27. For a thorough account of the issue of sex offenders in American law, see generally JENKINS, 
supra note 4. 
 28. Retka, supra note 1, at 14 (listing jurisdictions with SVP statutes). At the time of this writing, 
there are at least nineteen states that have some form of involuntary commitment for sexually violent 
predators. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (2010); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§§ 6601–6667 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910–.932 (West Supp. 2011); 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 207/1–99 (2006); IOWA CODE §§ 229A.1–.16 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a21 
(2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1–16 (West Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 253B.001–.23 (West Supp. 2011); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 632.480–.513 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 135-E:1 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.24 to .35 (West Supp. 2010); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW 
§ 10 (McKinney Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3 (2002); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 9791–9799.9 (West Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2009); TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841 (West 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 to -920 (West Supp. 2009); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010–.903 (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01–.14 (West 1998). 
The federal government also has this power. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006). The validity of the federal 
statute was recently upheld by the Supreme Court, overruling decisions by the Fourth Circuit and 
district court that Congress lacked the constitutional power to enact § 4248. See United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). Justice Thomas‘s dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the 
statute could not be constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause if it could not be attributed 
to any of Congress‘s enumerated powers. See id. at 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court made 
clear that it was not deciding the constitutionality of the federal statute or similar state statutes on any 
other grounds. See id. at 1965 (majority opinion) (―We do not reach or decide any claim that the 
statute or its application denies equal protection of the laws, procedural or substantive due process, or 
any other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondents are free to pursue those claims on 
remand, and any others they have preserved.‖). 
 29. Compare, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29-a20, -a10 (asserting that the general rule is that 
individuals are not eligible for any less restrictive measure that would release them from the physical 
custody of the state, subject to some exceptions), with TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081 
(West 1999) (providing for exclusively outpatient commitment). 
 30. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 260–61 (2001) (noting that the relevant statutes in 
Washington and Kansas are ―strikingly similar‖); see also Grant H. Morris, The Evil that Men Do: 
Perverting Justice to Punish Perverts, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1204 n.45 (2000) (observing that 
―states typically mimic the Washington/Kansas model.‖). 
 31. To ensure that the statutory scheme is not taken out of context, Missouri‘s SVP law will be 
used as a representative example to illustrate the general structure of involuntary civil commitments. 
To the best of my knowledge, at the time of this writing Missouri‘s program has never recommended a 
participant for release. See Retka, supra note 1, at 14. 
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offense and given a criminal sentence. Toward the end of the convict‘s 
incarceration, the state attorney general may instigate proceedings to 
determine whether the convict fits the statutory definition of an SVP.
 32
 
The statutory definition of an SVP
33
 generally consists of two components: 
a conviction for a predicate sexual crime,
34
 and a ―mental abnormality‖35 
that increases the likelihood of reoffending
36
 unless the person is confined 
to a secure facility.
37
 This determination is made in a civil trial,
38
 although 
 
 
 32. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 632.483 (2000). 
 33. See, e.g., id. § 632.480 (defining a sexually violent predator as ―any person who suffers from 
a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of 
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility and who‖ has plead guilty or been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense or been previously committed under the state‘s previous sexual psychopath 
statute). 
 34. See, e.g., id. (defining sexually violent offense as ―the felonies of forcible rape, rape, 
statutory rape in the first degree, forcible sodomy, sodomy, statutory sodomy in the first degree, or an 
attempt to commit any of the preceding crimes, or child molestation in the first or second degree, 
sexual abuse, sexual assault, deviate sexual assault, or the act of abuse of a child as defined‖). 
 35. See, e.g., id. Although the differences between a ―mental abnormality‖ versus a ―mental 
illness‖ or ―mental disorder‖ have been the subject of significant debate, see generally Steven I. 
Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 73 (1999), the Supreme Court dismissed the distinction for the purposes of the law. See infra 
note 78 and accompanying text. 
 36. Whether a particular convict is likely to reoffend can be very difficult to predict. See 
generally Hanson, supra note 7, at 63. This can lead to expert shopping, where the opponents search 
for a psychologist who will testify favorably for their side, regardless of what the state‘s psychologists 
or mental health departments say. See In re Care & Treatment of Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 178 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc) (―Once the state decides to proceed to commit one of these offenders, it can hardly 
lose. If the state psychiatrist cannot confidently state that an offender is a sexually violent predator, the 
state may shop around for an expert, even from another state.‖); see also Retka, supra note 1, at 15–16. 
In determining a particular criminal‘s likelihood of reoffending, psychologists often use actuarial 
formulas that factor in the characteristics of that criminal and his crime. See Davey & Goodnough, 
supra note 1 (―Actuarial formulas—akin to the tables used for life insurance—play a central role in 
deciding who is dangerous enough to be committed. They calculate someone‘s risk of offending again 
by looking at factors such as the number of prior sex offenses and the sex of the victims.‖). However, 
the actuarial formulas generally fail to account for factors that may change. See Abby Goodnough & 
Monica Davey, For Sex Offenders, a Dispute Over Therapy’s Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at 
A1 [hereinafter Goodnough & Davey, Therapy] (―Most actuarial tools used to predict someone‘s risk 
of recidivism consider only unchanging factors . . . . Some scientists say that so-called dynamic 
factors—how much treatment an offender gets, for example, and how old he has grown—should factor 
heavily into actuarial risk assessment, too.‖). Psychologists in Canada are working on new actuarial 
tools aimed at being more sensitive to ―dynamic variables, including substance abuse, hostility and 
rejection of supervision.‖ Retka, supra note 1, at 16. Although the prediction tools have become ―more 
of a science over the last decade,‖ ―[t]he results of the screening process are inconsistent.‖ Davey & 
Goodnough, supra note 1. Furthermore, ―[s]ome offenders are passed up for civil confinement, only to 
commit vicious crimes again; others‘ physical ailments alone make them unlikely repeat predators.‖ 
Id. 
 37. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A.2 (West Supp. 2010) (―‗Sexually violent predator‘ means a 
person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a 
mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually 
violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility.‖). The precise wording of the definition may vary 
between states, which can sometimes alter the burden of proving that a convict fits the definition. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2011] THE VALIDITY OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS 1287 
 
 
 
 
the trial often has some modifications that are more characteristic of a 
criminal trial.
39
 If the jury finds that the convict fits the statutory definition 
of an SVP,
40
 he must be committed to a facility for care and treatment
41
 
until such time that it is safe to release him,
42
 meaning until such time that 
he no longer fits the statutory definition of an SVP. A person committed as 
an SVP is given annual evaluations to decide whether he still fits the 
statutory definition of an SVP,
43
 and he may also request such an 
evaluation at any time.
44
 Under such schemes, an individual found to be an 
SVP can be involuntarily committed for treatment in a secure facility for 
the rest of his life after having served his criminal sentence.
45
  
 
 
Compare, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2005) (―‗Sexually violent predator‘ means any person 
. . . who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to 
engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.‖ (emphasis added)), with MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (2000) 
(―‗Sexually violent predator‘ [is] any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the 
person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). 
 38. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 632.492 (2000).  
 39. Such modifications include the right to counsel and the right to demand a jury trial. See id.; 
see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371 (1986) (noting that the right to counsel and a jury trial are 
―procedural safeguards usually found in criminal trials‖). 
 40. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495 (―The court or jury shall determine whether, by clear 
and convincing evidence, the person is a sexually violent predator. If such determination that the 
person is a sexually violent predator is made by a jury, such determination shall be by unanimous 
verdict of such jury.‖). 
 41. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495 (―If the court or jury determines that the person is a 
sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed to the custody of the director of the 
department of mental health for control, care and treatment . . . .‖). Such mandatory jury instructions 
have the potential to fill the jury members with sympathy for the offender, encouraging them to 
commit him so that he can receive the necessary treatment. Retka, supra note 1, at 14 (noting that the 
universal response from jury members was ―‗[n]ot hatred, not anger, not vindictiveness. It was 
sympathy for their mental abnormality and the hope they would get the help they needed.‘‖). 
 42. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 632.501 (2000). 
 43. Id. § 632.498. 
 44. See, e.g., id. The apparent reasonableness of this provision is seriously undercut by the 
methodology that is employed by some psychologists. For example, a frequently used actuarial tool is 
the Static-99, a ten-item test that evaluates the offender‘s likelihood of reoffense based on the 
offender‘s past sex offenses. Retka, supra note 1, at 16. The problem is that the factors in the test 
remain static, regardless of how long an offender has been in treatment. Id. The possibility of being 
released because of a decreased likelihood of reoffending, therefore, is substantially diminished. See 
id. For more detailed analyses of risk assessment methods, see generally Gregory DeClue, Practice 
Standards and Guidelines for the Evaluation, Treatment, and Management of Sexual Abusers: 
Bamboozle No More, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 197, 205–06 (2006), and Hanson, supra note 7, at 63. 
 45. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997) (―Notwithstanding its civil attributes, the 
practical effect of [sexually violent predator laws] may be to impose confinement for life. At this stage 
of medical knowledge, although future treatments cannot be predicted, psychiatrists or other 
professionals engaged in treating pedophilia may be reluctant to find measureable success in treatment 
even after a long period and may be unable to predict that no serious danger will come from release of 
the detainee.‖); see also Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (―‗[A]ll too often the 
promise of treatment has served only to bring an illusion of benevolence to what is essentially a 
warehousing operation for social misfits . . . .‘‖ (quoting United States ex rel Stachulak v. Coughlin, 
520 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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It appears that the general effect of such statutes has been life sentences 
imposed on these individuals after having served their criminal 
sentences.
46
 Only ―a small fraction‖ of SVPs progress through the 
treatment regimes and are released from confinement.
47
 Juries are 
understandably prone to label convicts as SVPs.
48
 Furthermore, the 
methods that are commonly used to measure an individual‘s likelihood of 
reoffending,
49
 which is what his release ultimately depends on,
50
 are 
largely static and therefore fail to account for how long an SVP has been 
in treatment.
51
  
There is also an apparent disparity of treatment effectiveness among 
states that provide for civil commitment.
52
 Although rates for successful 
completion of the program and release are generally low,
53
 some states 
have never recommended the release of an individual following successful 
treatment, while others have released a disproportionate amount.
54
 One 
state‘s utter failure to produce a single success story, when compared to 
 
 
 46.  See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372. 
 47. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1.  
Nearly 3,000 sex offenders have been committed since the first law passed in 1990. In 18 of 
the 19 states, about 50 have been released completely from commitment because clinicians or 
state-appointed evaluators deemed them ready. Some 115 other people have been sent home 
because of legal technicalities, court rulings, terminal illness or old age. In discharging 
offenders, Arizona, the remaining state, has been the exception. That state has fully 
discharged 81 people . . . . 
Id. For a graphical representation of some statistics, see Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1. 
 48. See Retka, supra note 1, at 14; see also In re Care & Treatment of Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 
178 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (―The fact that juries regularly find convicted sex offenders to be sexually 
violent predators should come as no surprise. Even where there is doubt about whether the offender 
has a mental abnormality, what juror wants to free someone who may someday molest another child? 
The state is, of course, required to prove its case for commitment ‗beyond a reasonable doubt.‘ But in 
this context, is this much of a safeguard?‖). Such realities also undermine the purported value of the 
risk prediction tools. See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (―Politics and emotion also factor heavily 
into who gets committed, with decisions made by elected judges or juries who may be more affected 
by the raw facts of someone‘s offense history or the public spectacle over their crimes than the dry 
science of risk prediction.‖). 
 49. See supra note 36. 
 50. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 632.501 (2000) (―If the director of the department of mental 
health determines that the person's mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to 
commit acts of sexual violence if released, the director shall authorize the person to petition the court 
for release.‖). 
 51. See supra note 36. 
 52. See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. Missouri and Arizona offer starkly contrasting stories of success. Compare Retka, 
supra note 1, at 14 (―The Missouri Department of Mental Health, which runs the facility, hasn‘t 
recommended a single resident for release. In several other states that commit sexual predators, 
including Minnesota and Iowa, the same is true: After years of commitment, no resident has been 
released.‖), with supra note 47 (noting that Arizona has fully discharged 81 people).  
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another state with a modest rate of success, leads one to ask whether there 
may be a problem or deficiency in the way that treatment is being 
administered.  
II. THE EFFECT OF TREATMENT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
MODERN STATUTORY SCHEME 
The constitutionality of involuntary civil commitment statutes has been 
challenged under a number of theories, such as ex post facto, double 
jeopardy, and substantive due process.
55
 In each of the cases that have 
come before the Supreme Court, the issue of treatment has been an 
important part of the Court‘s analysis of the constitutionality of the 
scheme.  
In Allen v. Illinois,
56
 Terry Allen was indicted for ―the crimes of 
unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault,‖ and an accompanying 
petition was filed to have him declared sexually dangerous.
57
 Allen 
submitted to two court-ordered psychiatric examinations in preparation for 
a civil trial to determine whether he fell within the statutory definition
58
 of 
a sexually dangerous person.
59
 When the State attempted to use the 
psychiatric examinations at trial, Allen objected, asserting his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
60
 The Supreme Court of 
Illinois unanimously held that the privilege was inapplicable because the 
proceedings were civil,
61
 stating that the statute was designed to provide 
―treatment, not punishment.‖62 On appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court, Allen argued that the privilege was applicable because the sexually 
dangerous person proceedings were criminal, despite being labeled civil in 
 
 
 55. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (double jeopardy and ex post facto); Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto); see also 
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (Fifth Amendment privilege). 
 56. 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
 57. Id. at 365–66. 
 58. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, ¶ 105-1.01 (1985) (―All persons suffering from a mental disorder . . . 
coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated 
propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children, are hereby declared 
sexually dangerous persons.‖). The definition of a sexually violent person under the current Illinois 
statute, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/5 (2006), differs from the statute at issue in Allen. The differences 
in the statutory definitions, however, do not have an effect on the Court‘s analysis for the purposes of 
this Note.  
 59. Allen, 478 U.S. at 366.  
 60. Id. at 366. 
 61. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (―No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). 
 62. Allen, 478 U.S. at 367 (citing People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d 690, 694–95 (1985)). 
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the statute.
63
 To support this claim, Allen noted that the civil proceedings 
could not be brought in the absence of criminal charges, that the State was 
required to prove at least one criminal sexual act, and that the civil 
proceedings had several ―procedural safeguards usually found in criminal 
trials.‖64 After agreeing that the civil label alone was not dispositive,65 the 
Court held that Allen‘s arguments failed to show a punitive purpose or 
effect.
66
 The Court emphasized that Illinois had statutorily obliged itself to 
provide treatment and had ―disavowed any interest in punishment.‖67 The 
Court also asserted that ―the State [had] serve[d] its purpose of treating 
rather than punishing sexually dangerous persons by committing them to 
an institution expressly designed to provide psychiatric care and 
treatment.‖68 The Court implicitly acknowledged its heavy reliance on the 
treatment provision when it noted in dicta that a different case would be 
presented if a committed person could show that his conditions of 
confinement were the same as a prisoner‘s.69 The four dissenting Justices 
argued that ―[a] goal of treatment is not sufficient . . . to prevent a 
characterization of proceedings as ‗criminal.‘‖70 The dissent reasoned that 
to allow a stated goal of treatment to bar a characterization of the statute as 
criminal would enable legislatures to circumvent sentencing limitations 
 
 
 63. Id. at 368–69. 
 64. Id. at 370–71. 
 65. Id. at 369 (finding that the civil label could be overcome by ―‗the clearest proof‘ that ‗the 
statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State‘s] intention‘ that the 
proceeding be civil‖ (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980) (alterations in 
original))). 
 66. See id. at 374. 
 67. Id. at 369–70. 
 68. Id. at 373. It is worth noting, however, that the majority considered it sufficient that the 
institution be ―expressly designed for psychiatric care and treatment‖ in spite of their 
acknowledgement that ―the record here tells us little or nothing about the regimen at the psychiatric 
center . . . .‖ Id. (emphasis added). This illustrates the Court‘s willingness to defer to a state‘s proffered 
purpose, however basic it may be, while reserving the question of actual application for another day.  
 69. See id. at 373–74. The Court stated:  
Had petitioner shown, for example, that the confinement of such persons imposes on them a 
regimen which is essentially identical to that imposed upon felons with no need for 
psychiatric care, this might well be a different case. But the record here tells us little or 
nothing about the regimen at the psychiatric center . . . . We therefore cannot say that the 
conditions of petitioner‘s confinement themselves amount to ―punishment‖ and thus render 
―criminal‖ the proceedings which led to confinement.  
Id. (emphasis added). A later Supreme Court dissenting opinion recognized the critical importance of 
treatment in the Allen Court‘s decision. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 382 (1997) (―The 
Allen Court‘s focus upon treatment, as a kind of touchstone helping to distinguish civil from punitive 
purposes, is not surprising . . . .‖) (5–4 decision) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 70. Allen, 478 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added). 
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and indefinitely commit people, resulting in the ―evisceration of criminal 
law and its accompanying protections.‖71 
The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of treatment in even greater 
depth in Kansas v. Hendricks.
72
 Leroy Hendricks was a habitual child 
molester and the first target
73
 of Kansas‘s newly enacted Sexually Violent 
Predator Act.
74
 Hendricks challenged his commitment, arguing that the 
Act violated substantive due process,
75
 placed him in double jeopardy, and 
was an ex post facto law.
76
 The Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act 
on substantive due process grounds because of the wording of the statutory 
definition.
77
 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
Act did not violate substantive due process.
78
 The Court went on to hold 
that the Act did not place Hendricks in double jeopardy or operate as an ex 
post facto law because it was not punitive, and therefore was not criminal 
in nature.
79
 To determine that the Act had no punitive purpose or effect, 
the Court employed the same reasoning that it did in Allen.
80
 The Court 
then addressed Hendricks‘s argument that the Act was ―necessarily 
punitive because it fail[ed] to offer any legitimate ‗treatment.‘‖81 
 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 73. Id. at 350. 
 74. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a22 (1994) (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 59-29a01 to -29a22 (2005)). 
 75. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356, 358–59 (noting that when determining whether the ―Act's 
definition of ‗mental abnormality‘ satisfies ‗substantive‘ due process requirements,‖ the Court stated 
that ―Hendricks . . . argues that our earlier cases dictate a finding of ‗mental illness‘ as a prerequisite 
for civil commitment . . . . citing Foucha [v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)] and Addington [v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418 (1979)]. He then asserts that a ‗mental abnormality‘ is not equivalent to a ‗mental illness‘ 
because it is a term coined by the Kansas Legislature, rather than by the psychiatric community.‖).  
 76. Id. at 361 (―The thrust of Hendricks‘ argument is that the Act establishes criminal 
proceedings; hence confinement under it necessarily constitutes punishment. He contends that where, 
as here, newly enacted ‗punishment‘ is predicated upon past conduct for which he has already been 
convicted and forced to serve a prison sentence, the Constitution‘s Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto 
Clauses are violated.‖). 
 77. Id. at 350. The Kansas Supreme Court understood the relevant precedent to require a finding 
of a ―mental illness‖ in order to support an involuntary civil commitment. In re Care & Treatment of 
Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996) [hereinafter In Re Hendricks]. Kansas‘s statutory definition 
of an SVP, however, only required a finding of a ―mental abnormality.‖ See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a02 (1994) (current version KAN. STAT. ANN § 59-29a02 (2005)).  
 78. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356. Regarding the ―mental illness‖ versus ―mental abnormality‖ 
distinction, the Court noted that ―[c]ontrary to Hendricks‘ assertion, the term ‗mental illness‘ is devoid 
of any talismanic significance,‖ and it had ―never required state legislatures to adopt any particular 
nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes.‖ Id. at 359. 
 79. Id. at 369–71. 
 80. See id. at 361–65; supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 81. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365. At the time of Hendricks‘s initial confinement, Kansas was 
apparently not prepared to deliver the treatment that it had obligated itself to provide in the newly 
enacted statute. See infra note 89. 
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Hendricks reasoned that ―[w]ithout [legitimate] treatment[,] . . . 
confinement under the Act amount[ed] to little more than disguised 
punishment.‖82 Indeed, the Kansas Supreme Court regarded the treatment83 
as ―somewhat disingenuous‖ and ―incidental, at best.‖84 The Supreme 
Court read the Kansas court‘s opinion to mean either that Hendricks was 
untreatable
85
 or that he was treatable but no treatment was being 
provided.
86
 The Supreme Court then evaluated the sufficiency of 
Hendricks‘s treatment using an analysis under the professional judgment 
standard
87
 and found that the State had ―doubtless satisfied its obligation 
to provide available treatment.‖88 The Court was apparently not deterred 
by strong indications that Hendricks was receiving ―essentially no 
treatment.‖89 Having concluded that the Act was civil, the double jeopardy 
and ex post facto claims were necessarily found to be without merit.
90
  
 
 
 82. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365. 
 83. Treatment was not a defined term in the statute. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1994) (the 
current version, at KAN. STAT. ANN § 59-29a02 (2005), is the same in the relevant respects). Rather, 
the statute simply stated that ―[t]he involuntary detention or commitment of persons under this act 
shall conform to constitutional requirements for care and treatment.‖ Id. § 59-29a09. The purpose of 
this provision was obviously to bolster the statute‘s validity, not to provide any meaningful guidance. 
 84. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365 (―‗It is clear that the overriding concern of the legislature is to 
continue the segregation of sexually violent offenders from the public. Treatment with the goal of 
reintegrating them into society is incidental, at best. The record reflects that treatment for sexually 
violent predators is all but nonexistent. . . . [T]he provisions of the Act for treatment appear somewhat 
disingenuous.‘‖ (quoting In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996))).  
 85. Id. at 365 (―It is possible to read [the Kansas Supreme Court‘s opinion] as a determination 
that Hendricks‘ condition was untreatable . . . .‖). The Court suggested that Hendricks‘s untreatability 
would not prevent his confinement. See id. at 366 (―[W]e have never held that the Constitution 
prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless 
pose a danger to others.‖). 
 86. Id. at 366–67. 
 87. See id. at 368 n.4 (―We have explained that the States enjoy wide latitude in developing 
treatment regimens.‖ (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982))). The professional 
judgment standard, which was established in Youngberg, states that treatment decisions for 
involuntarily committed individuals, ―if made by a professional, [are] presumptively valid; liability 
may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from 
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible 
actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.‖ Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 
(1982) (footnote omitted). The Youngberg Court defined a professional decision maker as ―a person 
competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue.‖ Id. 
at 323 n.30.  
 88. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368 n.4.  
 89. Id. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. Charles Befort in state habeas corpus 
proceeding); see also id. at 377–78 (―[The Kansas Supreme Court] found that Kansas did not provide 
Hendricks with significant treatment.‖); id. at 384 (―The record provides support for the Kansas 
court‘s conclusion. The court found that, as of the time of Hendricks‘ commitment, the State had not 
funded treatment, it had not entered into treatment contracts, and it had little, if any, qualified 
treatment staff.‖). Justice Breyer‘s dissent looked further into the case to illustrate the soundness of the 
Kansas court‘s conclusion, saying: ―Indeed, were we to follow the majority‘s invitation to look beyond 
the record in this case, . . . it would reveal that Hendricks, according to the commitment program‘s 
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The dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer suggested that the majority 
had not focused on the proper question.
91
 Justice Breyer concluded that the 
Act was punitive by focusing the question on whether a state violates the 
Due Process Clause in failing to provide available treatment to a treatable 
person.
92
 Justice Breyer supported his conclusion through syllogistic 
reasoning: (1) ―[O]ne would expect a nonpunitively motivated legislature 
that confines because of a dangerous mental abnormality to seek to help 
the individual himself overcome that abnormality;‖93 (2) Kansas did not 
provide significant treatment to Hendricks;
94
 (3) as a result, the Act was 
punishment as to Hendricks.
95
 
Most recently, in Seling v. Young, the Supreme Court rejected an as-
applied challenge to Washington state‘s SVP statute based on double 
jeopardy and ex post facto grounds.
96
 Andre Brigham Young was a civilly 
committed rapist
97
 who had unsuccessfully challenged his confinement 
through the state courts.
98
 Young then brought a habeas action in federal 
 
 
own director, was receiving ‗essentially no treatment.‘‖ Id. at 384 (quoting the Testimony of Dr. 
Charles Befort). In the record before the Court, Dr. Befort additionally stated that ―[t]he treatment that 
is prescribed by statute‖ is ―still not available[,]‖ the ―needed treatment . . . hasn‘t been delivered yet,‖ 
and ―Hendricks has wasted ten months‖ in ―terms of treatment effects.‖ Id. Finally, Dr. Befort 
admitted he was not qualified to be SVP program director. Id. 
 90. See id. at 369–71 (majority opinion). 
 91. Id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (―This case does not require us to consider whether the Due 
Process Clause always requires treatment—whether, for example, it would forbid civil confinement of 
an untreatable mentally ill, dangerous person. . . . Rather, the basic substantive due process treatment 
question is whether that Clause requires Kansas to provide treatment that it concedes is potentially 
available to a person whom it concedes is treatable.‖). 
 92. See id. at 378–79 
 93. Id. at 382. 
 94. See supra note 89. 
 95. Id. at 395. The dissent seems to be arguing for an as-applied analysis under substantive due 
process for individuals challenging the legitimacy of their confinement because of a lack of sufficient 
treatment. See id. at 393 (noting that if the Court relied on the state court as it had in Allen, it ―would 
mean the Act as applied to Leroy Hendricks (as opposed to others who may have received treatment or 
who were sentenced after the effective date of the Act) is punitive‖); id. at 395 (―I have pointed to 
those features of the Act itself, in the context of this litigation, that lead me to conclude, in light of our 
precedent, that the added confinement the Act imposes upon Hendricks is basically punitive. This 
analysis, rooted in the facts surrounding Kansas‘ failure to treat Hendricks, cannot answer the question 
whether the Kansas Act, as it now stands, and in light of its current implementation, is punitive toward 
people other than he.‖). For a discussion about as-applied challenges to SVP statutes, see generally 
Eric S. Janus & Brad Bolin, An End-Game for Sexually Violent Predator Laws: As-Applied 
Invalidation, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 25 (2008).  
 96. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001). Young‘s argument was essentially that ―the 
conditions of his confinement at the Center [were] too restrictive, that the conditions [were] 
incompatible with treatment, and that the system [was] designed to result in indefinite confinement.‖ 
Id. at 262. 
 97. Id. at 255. 
 98. Id. at 258. 
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court,
99
 which eventually
100
 resulted in the Ninth Circuit agreeing that 
―actual conditions of confinement could divest a facially valid statute of its 
civil label upon a showing by the clearest proof that the statutory scheme 
is punitive in effect.‖101 Young alleged that the conditions of confinement 
were incompatible with treatment and afforded no possibility of being 
released.
102
 The Supreme Court recognized the seriousness of Young‘s 
allegations,
103
 but ultimately refused to question the Washington Supreme 
Court‘s conclusion that the statute was facially civil.104 The Supreme 
Court noted that an as-applied challenge on double jeopardy and ex post 
facto grounds was ―unworkable‖ because ―[s]uch an analysis would never 
conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would 
thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme‘s validity.‖105 
Furthermore, the Court felt that Young‘s as-applied challenge represented 
an attempted ―end run around‖ the state supreme court‘s ruling that the 
statute was civil.
106
  
For the purposes of this Note, the most interesting discussion in Seling 
happened in dicta. The majority noted that the case did not allow the Court 
to consider whether and to what extent the Court might ―look to actual 
 
 
 99. Id.  
 100. ―The District Court granted the writ, concluding that the Act violated substantive due 
process, that the Act was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post 
facto guarantees of the Constitution.‖ Id. While the appeal of that decision was pending, Hendricks 
was decided and Young‘s case was remanded ―for reconsideration in light of Hendricks.‖ Id. The 
district court denied the writ on remand. Id. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the dismissal of Young‘s 
due process claims were affirmed, but the double jeopardy and ex post facto claims were found to 
survive despite the civil label of the statute. Id. at 258–59. 
 101. Id. at 259. Describing the Ninth Circuit‘s decision, the Supreme Court summarized that 
―[t]he ‗linchpin‘ of Young‘s claims, the [Ninth Circuit] reasoned, was whether the Act was punitive 
‗as applied‘ to Young.‖ Id. 
 102. Id. at 260 (―Young also contended that conditions at the Center were incompatible with the 
Act‘s treatment purpose. . . . The Center still lacked certified sex offender treatment providers. Finally, 
there was no possibility of release. A court-appointed resident advocate and psychologist concluded in 
his final report that because the Center had not fundamentally changed over so many years, he had 
come to suspect that the Center was designed and managed to punish and confine individuals for life 
without any hope of release to a less restrictive setting.‖). 
 103. Id. at 263 (―[W]e do not deny that some of [Young‘s] allegations are serious.‖). 
 104. See id. (―[W]e evaluate [Young‘s] allegations as presented in a double jeopardy and ex post 
facto challenge under the assumption that the Act is civil.‖). 
 105. Id. The Court‘s reasoning was that the conditions were not a fixed event, but rather 
something that may change over time. Id. The Court asserted that these changes could affect the 
evaluation of the statute‘s criminal versus civil nature, and therefore a definitive answer could not be 
reached by looking at the statute‘s application. Id. No cases were cited in support of this reasoning. See 
id. 
 106. Id. at 263–64 (―Permitting respondent‘s as-applied challenge would invite an end run around 
the Washington Supreme Court‘s decision that the Act is civil in circumstances where a direct attack 
on that decision is not before this Court.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2011] THE VALIDITY OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS 1295 
 
 
 
 
conditions of confinement and implementation of the statute to determine 
in the first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature.‖107 
Justice Scalia wrote his concurrence specifically ―to dissociate [himself] 
from any implication that this reserved point may be an open question.‖108 
Justice Scalia expressed his view that a facially civil statute may not be 
invalidated because of harsh implementation that would render it criminal 
―for Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clause purposes‖ because ―the 
question of criminal penalty . . . depends upon the intent of the 
legislature.‖109 Justice Scalia‘s reasoning seems to be that the Double 
Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses are designed to protect citizens from 
improper legislative intent, rather than improper executive 
implementation. Justice Scalia‘s concurrence went on, however, to suggest 
that a due process challenge could establish a facially civil statute as 
criminal if ―harsh executive implementation . . . . contradict[ed] the 
statute‘s civil character,‖ and state courts had ―authoritatively interpret[ed] 
the state statute as permitting impositions that are indeed punitive.‖110 
Justice Scalia apparently suggests, therefore, that SVPs may be able to 
launch a challenge under the Due Process Clause if the implementation 
contradicts the statutory purpose. As one commentator has noted, 
―[d]espite the outcome . . . most members of the Court appeared to 
assume—or at least leave open the possibility—that evidence of a 
statutory scheme‘s implementation might dislodge early ‗facial‘ findings 
of proper statutory purpose.‖111 
Although the Supreme Court has rejected challenges to SVP statutes to 
date,
112
 a careful reading of the Court‘s precedent reveals at least two ways 
that such statutes might be invalidated based in large part on a showing of 
inadequate treatment. The first way would be if the Supreme Court were 
faced with the determination of whether the statute is criminal or civil in 
 
 
 107. Id. at 266. The Supreme Court did not have an occasion to determine the statute‘s civil or 
criminal nature in the first instance because the Washington Supreme Court had already done so. See 
id. at 265. Justice Stevens made clear in his dissent that he did not find that reasoning persuasive. See 
id. at 277 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―If conditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been 
punished twice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has been 
previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the statute.‖). The Court also ―did 
not decide whether a different legal theory, substantive due process, would provide redress in an ‗as 
applied‘ context.‖ Eric S. Janus, Treatment and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, in 
PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, supra note 1, at 126. 
 108. Young, 531 U.S. at 267 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 269 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 269–70; see also Janus & Bolin, supra note 95, at 40–41. 
 111. Janus & Bolin, supra note 95, at 39.  
 112. See Young, 531 U.S. at 250; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
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the first instance.
113
 The Court might look to the actual conditions of 
confinement in deciding whether the civil label would be accepted.
114
 If 
the Court were to conclude that the SVPs were being confined under 
conditions that were essentially the same as prisoners who have no right to 
treatment, then the Act could be divested of its civil nature, found to be 
criminal,
115
 and therefore violative of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post 
Facto Clauses.
116
 The other way that inadequate treatment might lead to 
invalidation of a statute would be if harsh executive implementation 
resulted in punitive conditions and was supported in the state courts.
117
 
This would reveal the criminal effect, or perhaps even the original 
purpose, of the statute.
118
 This approach would have invalidation 
implications as a substantive due process challenge.
119
 
Based on the aforementioned Supreme Court precedent and the 
statutorily imposed obligations,
120
 it seems that there is a qualified right to 
reasonable treatment for involuntarily civilly committed sexually violent 
predators.
121
 Furthermore, it appears that the constitutional validity of such 
statutes can be critically affected by the presence or absence of 
treatment.
122
 But establishing that some right to treatment exists does not 
answer the equally daunting question of implementation.  
III. PROVIDING TREATMENT 
A. What is Treatment? 
This area of psychological treatment suffers from a relative lack of 
data,
123
 research,
124
 and professional consensus.
125
 Important questions 
 
 
 113. See Young, 531 U.S. at 266–67. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373–74 (1986). 
 116. See Young, 531 U.S. at 266. 
 117. See id. at 269–70 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 118. See Janus & Bolin, supra note 95, at 41 (―It is not clear, nor may it ultimately matter, 
whether the post-enactment actions of the state changed the law‘s character, or merely revealed its 
(pre-existing) true character. The important point here is that . . . the purpose might be revealed by 
post-enactment implementation.‖).  
 119. See id.  
 120. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 367 (1997). With varying degrees of 
specificity, all SVP statutes oblige the state to provide treatment. See supra note 28. 
 121. Janus, supra note 107, at 125–26. 
 122. See id. at 120 (―Arguments about the nature and efficacy of sex offender treatment are central 
to the constitutional debates about sex offender commitment statutes . . . .‖). 
 123. See Goodnough & Davey, Therapy, supra note 36 (―[S]ex offenders present major challenges 
as research subjects. There are far fewer convicted sex offenders than most other kinds of criminals, so 
sample groups are unreliably small. And sex offenders tend to be so secretive that ‗it‘s really hard to 
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remain largely unsettled. If sexually violent predators are treatable,
126
 what 
are the most effective treatments?
127
 Can treatment give SVPs a reasonable 
chance of being rehabilitated and released? What methods of treatment are 
available? Are there generally accepted standards or guidelines for treating 
this class of offenders? Given the presently amorphous definition of 
treatment for SVPs, it is only logical that they have attempted to 
demarcate the contours of their right to treatment through litigation. 
B. Challenging the Adequacy of Treatment 
1. The Professional Judgment Standard 
When challenging the sufficiency of treatment, litigants are faced with 
the serious challenge of overcoming the professional judgment standard as 
articulated in Youngberg v. Romeo.
128
 Under this standard, treatment 
decisions for involuntarily committed individuals, ―if made by a 
professional, [are] presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only 
when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from 
 
 
get information from them that you can have confidence in,‘ said Ted Shaw, a forensic psychologist in 
Gainesville, Fla., who has treated offenders since 1982.‖). 
 124. See DeClue, supra note 44, at 203–04 (―There is currently some difference of opinion about 
what to make of recent studies that do show differences in detected recidivism between treated sex 
offenders and untreated controls, because those studies all have significant design limitations.‖); 
Goodnough & Davey, Therapy, supra note 36 (―‗It has never been regarded as a legitimate and 
recognized topic for research by psychologists,‘ said Robert A. Prentky, director of research at the 
Justice Research Institute in Boston. ‗There is a very strong undercurrent of disrespect for this area of 
research and perhaps even skepticism, frankly.‘‖). 
 125. See DeClue, supra note 44, at 203–04 (―In sum, there is considerable controversy over 
whether and to what extent sex-offender treatment reduces sexual recidivism. A corollary is that if sex-
offender treatment does work, we do not know which treatment techniques or methods work best.‖); 
Janus, supra note 107, at 121 (―Currently, there is no consensus about the efficacy of sex offender 
treatment . . . .‖). 
 126. Whether sex offenders are treatable at all is a subject of ongoing debate. See, e.g., DeClue, 
supra note 44, at 203–04 (noting disagreement between ―‗the agnostic view‘ that ‗simply put, the 
effectiveness of adult sex offender treatment has yet to be demonstrated‘ and the ‗cautiously optimistic 
view‘ that ‗the balance of available evidence suggests that current treatments reduce recidivism, but 
that firm conclusions await more and better research‘‖ (quoting J.Q. LAFOND, PREVENTING SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE: HOW SOCIETY SHOULD COPE WITH SEX OFFENDERS 80 (2005))). Furthermore, some SVPs 
evidently do not think highly of the effectiveness of treatment. See Davey & Goodnough, Therapy, 
supra note 36 (―‗Most of those guys, they are just faking it to make it,‘ [a convicted rapist who 
completed treatment and was released a year ago] said. ‗They‘re just waiting to get released so they 
can go right back to what they were doing.‘‖). The litigant in Hendricks poignantly commented that 
―treatment is bull——.‖ Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997).  
 127. For an overview of common treatments, see Rice & Harris, supra note 1, at 101 (discussing 
nonbehavioral psychotherapy, castration and pharmacological treatments, and behavioral and 
cognitive-behavioral treatments). See also supra note 125. 
 128. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1298 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1281 
 
 
 
 
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate 
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a 
judgment.‖129 This standard gives an extraordinary amount of deference to 
a qualified professional‘s treatment decisions130 unless the decision is a 
major break with the norm. 
The professional judgment standard is designed to give state 
administrators ―wide latitude‖ in deciding how to implement treatment in 
their facilities.
131
 The deference afforded to administrators through this 
standard prevents the courts from interfering with state-run facilities
132
 that 
the judiciary is ill equipped to question. Unless the qualified professional‘s 
treatment decision is a wild departure from general practice, the courts 
must abide. 
2. The Problems of Applying the Professional Judgment Standard to 
the Context of Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Programs 
The professional judgment standard is anchored in the idea that the 
courts will not interfere with a qualified professional‘s treatment decision 
unless there is a substantial departure from the accepted norms.
133
 The 
courts are directed to use the accepted norms of the profession to evaluate 
a given decision.
134
 
There is not, however, a generally accepted practice or standard when 
it comes to the treatment of SVPs.
135
 One commentator noted that ―[t]here 
is not enough current scientific evidence about the efficacy of sex-offender 
treatments to warrant strict confidence in any set of treatment 
guidelines.‖136 There is a healthy and ongoing debate as to whether they 
are treatable at all,
137
 which treatments work,
138
 and which standards 
should be used for treatment and ethical conduct.
139
 The Association for 
 
 
 129. Id. at 323 (footnote omitted). 
 130. See Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the “Experts”: From Deference to Abdication 
Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 646 (1992).  
 131. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368 n.4 (―We have explained that the States enjoy wide latitude in 
developing treatment regimens.‖ (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317)). 
 132. See Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that deference under the 
professional judgment standard in Youngberg is meant to ―minimize the interference by the federal 
judiciary with the internal operations of state institutions . . . .‖). 
 133. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 135. See DeClue, supra note 44, at 207. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 139. See DeClue, supra note 44, at 207 (critiquing the Association for the Treatment of Sexual 
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the Treatment of Sexual Abusers (ATSA) is the only organization that can 
arguably be said to have set standards and guidelines, but the validity of 
ATSA‘s suggestions has received serious criticism and is not 
representative of a professional consensus.
140
 Furthermore, ATSA‘s 
guidelines instruct its members to follow the standards unless, in their 
professional judgment, they feel that they should deviate.
141
 For the 
purpose of evaluating a treatment decision under the professional 
judgment standard, ATSA is therefore circular.
142
  
The professional judgment standard is currently impossible to apply 
with any modicum of confidence. In the absence of an egregious or 
absurdly erroneous treatment decision,
143
 it is difficult to imagine how a 
court could find that a treatment decision would fail under the standard. 
Without a baseline from which to measure a treatment decision‘s 
deviation, courts are unable to determine whether the challenged treatment 
is within the accepted standards or is instead a substantial deviation; 
because the decision is presumed valid, the default result will be judicial 
abdication of a principled review. 
 
 
Abusers‘ 2005 Practice Standards and Guidelines and finding that ―[t]here is not enough current 
scientific evidence about the efficacy of sex-offender treatments to warrant strict confidence in any set 
of treatment guidelines . . . .‖). 
 140. Compare Jill Levenson & David D‘Amora, Commentary, An Ethical Paradigm for Sex 
Offender Treatment: Response to Glaser, 6 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 145, 148–49 (2005) (defending, 
inter alia, the ATSA‘s Practice Standards and Guidelines and arguing that sex offender treatment can 
comport with ethical standards of treatment), with Bill Glaser, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Ethical 
Paradigm for Therapists in Sex Offender Treatment Programs, 4 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 143 (2003) 
(criticizing the ATSA Practice Standard Guidelines and arguing that many sex offender treatment 
programs are antithetical to traditional mental health ethics). 
 141. See DeClue, supra note 44, at 199 (―ATSA recognizes that members must exercise their 
professional judgment when interpreting and applying the ATSA Guidelines . . . .‖ (quoting ATSA 
Practice Standards and Guidelines)). 
 142. See id. If the guidance set forth in ATSA was the standard for dealing with sexually violent 
predators, then the professional judgment standard would be practically impossible to apply. Even 
treatment decisions that substantially departed from accepted professional judgment, practice, or 
standards would be permitted if the departure was made according to one‘s professional judgment. The 
end result would be a lack of meaningful constraint or review of treatment decisions. 
 143. As a hypothetical example, allowing participants in a sex offender treatment program 
unfettered access to pornographic materials would likely be considered an egregious treatment 
decision. However, a similar decision, such as allowing unfettered access to retail catalogs that have 
pictures of women and children, would most likely be considered a valid treatment decision that is 
well within the bounds of reason. The difference between pornography and retail catalogs changes the 
legal analysis, but the materials could be practically interchangeable in the eyes of a sex offender. This 
somewhat trivial example illustrates the zone of discretion in which poor (or possibly nefarious) 
treatment decisions can be excused from judicial oversight. 
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3. The Consequences of Applying the Professional Judgment Standard 
to the Context of Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Programs 
By continuing to use the professional judgment standard in a context 
where there is no accepted standard for treatment,
144
 the courts have 
―transfer[red] the safeguarding of constitutional rights from the courts to 
mental health professionals.‖145 Courts abandon their obligation to apply 
the law in a principled manner when they persist in using a standard that 
fails to provide a reliable metric. This creates a very broad, perhaps 
effectively limitless, zone of discretion where administrators could be 
providing treatment in a way that would pass judicial scrutiny, but that is 
designed specifically to never result in the rehabilitation and release of 
SVPs. Treatment decisions could be effectively immunized from judicial 
review as long as they provide any treatment, even if it is only ostensibly 
provided.
146
 Administrators only need to show that some treatment exists 
in order for an SVP‘s challenge to fail.147  
But by turning a deaf ear to grievances about the sufficiency of 
treatment, courts could unwittingly be opening the door to a general 
invalidation of a state‘s statutory scheme. By insulating treatment 
programs from review, the professional judgment standard enables 
potentially unchecked implementation and punitive conditions of 
 
 
 144. See supra notes 135–42 and accompanying text. 
 145. Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000) (―Appellants appear to suggest that 
because, in their capacities as mental health professionals, they believe they have complied with the 
legal requirements of the . . . Constitution in providing adequate mental health treatment, their 
decisions are beyond review. The district court correctly recognized that accepting such an argument 
would transfer the safeguarding of constitutional rights from the courts to mental health professionals. 
Conditions of confinement would be above judicial scrutiny and would depend on who happened to be 
in charge of a particular program.‖). The Ninth Circuit was specifically evaluating the administrators‘ 
claim that they deserved deference under the professional judgment standard as to their opinion that 
they were complying with a previously imposed injunction to improve the conditions and treatment at 
the Washington State facility. Despite the Ninth Circuit‘s strong tone in Sharp, the injunction was later 
resolved despite the State‘s ―continued failure to provide constitutionally adequate treatment.‖ See 
Smith, supra note 16, at 1421. In dissolving the injunction, the court bemoaned that ―[t]his case has 
been troublesome to the Court in that there seems to be no right answer, and no good fix for the 
situation that these plaintiffs face . . . .‖ Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, Turay v. 
Richards, No. C91-0664RSM, 2007 WL 983132, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2007). 
 146. Critics have called some treatment regimens ―‗sham treatment . . . that lasts for years, 
ostensibly to change someone‘s psychiatric diagnosis.‘‖ Retka, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting Dr. 
Delaney Dean).  
 147. This was precisely the level of scrutiny that the Court applied in Hendricks. Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 nn.4–5 (1997) (reasoning that ―Kansas ha[d] doubtless satisfied its 
obligation to provide available treatment‖ because ―the trial court, over admittedly conflicting 
testimony, ruled: ‗[T]he allegation that no treatment is being provided to any of the petitioners or other 
persons committed to the program designated as a sexual predator treatment program is not true. I find 
that they are receiving treatment.‘‖). 
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confinement.
148
 The professional judgment standard has the potential to 
facilitate the exact situation in which the Supreme Court has indicated a 
statute might be invalidated.
149
 For the purposes of protecting society from 
the release of dangerous SVPs, it seems that the professional judgment 
standard may represent a large risk, rather than a useful protection from 
litigation. Because the professional judgment standard has the potential to 
shield questionable treatment decisions from the light of judicial scrutiny, 
continued use of the standard could produce the type of ―harsh executive 
implementation‖ that Justice Scalia has suggested might lead to the 
invalidation of the statute under the Due Process Clause.
150
 The long-term 
implications of the standard, therefore, may be in significant tension with 
its goals. To put it bluntly, by continuing to use the professional judgment 
standard, the courts might unwittingly be giving the state administrators 
just enough rope to hang themselves. 
IV. SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTING 
TREATMENT 
When exploring strategies to address the difficulties associated with 
providing treatment to SVPs, a basic question is whether the solution will 
operate to avoid treatment or to improve it. 
A. Resolve Treatment Problems by Avoiding the Treatment Requirement 
Due to the many difficulties of providing treatment to sexually violent 
predators, one strategy might be simply to eliminate the statutory 
provision for treatment. The Court has strongly suggested that a state 
might, under certain circumstances, have the ability to confine dangerous 
individuals without treatment.
151
 It seems that the right to treatment stems 
 
 
 148. The logic used in the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning in Sharp v. Weston illustrates this problem 
well. The court was admonishing the state administrators for invoking the professional judgment 
standard to buttress the validity of his opinion that the state had complied with an injunction. The 
Ninth Circuit‘s logic, however, applies with equal strength to the proposition that the professional 
judgment standard should never be used when an involuntarily committed individual challenges the 
constitutionality of his treatment. See Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000); supra 
note 145. 
 149. See supra notes 112–32 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra notes 5, 117–19 and accompanying text.  
 151. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366: (―[W]e have never held that the Constitution prevents a 
State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a 
danger to others. A State could hardly be seen as furthering a ‗punitive‘ purpose by involuntarily 
confining persons afflicted with an untreatable, highly contagious disease.‖). 
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primarily from the enabling statute.
152
 Some have argued, however, that 
confinement may generate a qualified right to reasonable treatment as a 
matter of federal constitutional law.
153
 This would most likely require a 
legislative finding that this type of offender is untreatable.
154
 This strategy 
carries potential risks. It is unclear whether a legislature would find that 
these individuals are categorically untreatable,
155
 given the modest success 
of treatment in some schemes
156
 and the stance of professional 
organizations that at least certain aspects of the mental abnormality are 
treatable.
157
 Furthermore, by eliminating the treatment requirement, the 
state would essentially be confining individuals based solely on a suspect 
prediction about future dangerousness.
158
 Because the courts have relied 
heavily on the treatment provision as evidence that the statute is not 
improperly punitive,
159
 eliminating the treatment provision altogether 
would remove a keystone of the courts‘ past reasoning. For these reasons, 
eliminating the treatment provision from the statute is too blunt, 
unpredictable, and potentially destabilizing to warrant serious 
consideration. 
Another strategy for avoiding the treatment requirement would be to 
substantially increase the criminal sentences for certain sexual offenses 
that are viewed as most egregious and indicative of future 
dangerousness.
160
 This would result in the long-term confinement of these 
 
 
 152. See id. at 367 (―[C]ritical language in the Act itself demonstrates that the Secretary . . . has an 
obligation to provide treatment to individuals like Hendricks.‖); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 
(1986) (―Under the Act, the State has a statutory obligation to provide ‗care and treatment . . . .‘‖ 
(emphasis added)). 
 153. See Janus, supra note 107, at 126 (observing that Supreme Court precedent, when read 
together, could be interpreted to require some level of treatment). The argument for a right to treatment 
is even stronger in light of the indefinite nature of confinement under these statutes.  
 154. A finding of untreatability, or at least a finding that currently available treatments do not 
reduce recidivism, would be within the bounds of the available scholarly research. See DeClue, supra 
note 44, at 204 (summarizing the ambit of professional opinions, ranging from opinions that treatment 
enjoys modest (7%) reductions in recidivism rates to opinions that the evidence does not show a 
reduction in recidivism). At the time of this writing, no legislative finding of untreatability could be 
found. 
 155. The statute at issue in Hendricks noted that ―sexually violent predators generally have anti-
social personality features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities . . . .‖ 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). Similar language can be found in other states‘ statutes. See 
Morris, supra note 30, at 1204 (observing that ―states typically mimic the Washington/Kansas 
model.‖). The legislatures stop short, however, of finding that SVPs are absolutely untreatable. 
 156. See supra note 47. 
 157. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 388 (―Kansas, and supporting amici [from the ATSA and 
APA], argue that pedophilia is treatable.‖).  
 158. See supra note 36. 
 159. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 160. This fairly obvious alternative has been previously suggested by other commentators. See, 
e.g., Smith, supra note 16, at 1426. 
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dangerous individuals without the concurrent obligation to provide them 
with treatment. Indeed, the intense wrangling over whether such schemes 
are truly civil has led some to question whether these individuals are more 
appropriately dealt with in the criminal system.
161
 Handling these 
individuals through the criminal system is even more attractive in light of 
the cost savings to the state that would accrue if the civil commitment 
scheme were abandoned.
162
 Not only is it generally cheaper to keep these 
individuals in prison,
163
 but the higher costs associated with confinement 
in a facility for treatment are increasing.
164
 Some have argued that a cost-
benefit perspective of this problem suggests a ―powerful argument‖ in 
favor of increased criminal sentences.
165
 One potential drawback to this 
proposition is that it could only be applied prospectively;
166
 the individuals 
that are already confined under the civil commitment scheme would either 
need to be treated (with the aforementioned difficulties of implementation) 
or possibly released. Furthermore, ―stringent mandatory minimum 
sentences‖ could increase the difficulty of obtaining convictions.167 
Perhaps most troubling, though, would be prosecutors‘ decreased amount 
of ―discretion to seek just sentences based on the individual facts and 
circumstances of each case.‖168 More broadly, increasing the criminal 
sentence will only defer the question of what to do with these criminals 
when their sentences are over. Because such a draconian solution would, 
at the very least, carry a significant risk of imposing unduly harsh 
sentences on some individuals, a less heavy-handed approach is 
preferable. 
 
 
 161. See id. at 1426 n.360. 
 162. See id. at 1426 n.361. 
 163. On average, it is about four times more expensive to keep an individual in sex-offender 
treatment than prison. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (describing average cost of $100,000 for 
treatment versus $26,000 for prison). In 2007, states spent about $450 million on such programs. Id.  
 164. See, e.g., Retka, supra note 1, at 1 (graphing the increasing costs of Missouri‘s program from 
$3.9 million per year to $11.3 million per year over a six-year period).  
 165. See Smith, supra note 16, at 1427–28 (footnotes omitted) (―[T]here exists a powerful 
argument that the costs of civil commitment outweigh the costs associated with increased criminal 
penalties for sexually violent crimes. Because the state‘s motivation appears to be incapacitation and 
further punishment, simply increasing criminal penalties would be preferable to enacting civil 
commitment schemes. Civil commitment programs inevitably become the subject of extensive 
litigation, as states are reluctant to provide adequate treatment programs that provide a pathway to 
eventual release.‖). 
 166. The government cannot increase the penalty for a crime after the criminal act has been 
committed. To do so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The increased sentences could only be 
applied to future offenders. 
 167. See Smith, supra note 16, at 1428. 
 168. Id. 
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B. Abandon the Professional Judgment Standard for Evaluations of 
Treatment 
The validity of sexually violent predator commitment statutes could be 
strengthened by abandoning the highly deferential professional judgment 
standard for evaluating challenges to treatment decisions. Allowing SVPs 
to challenge their treatment has the obvious potential to invite increases in 
litigation, but providing a meaningful way to contest treatment decisions 
would also undermine constitutional attacks on the statute based upon a 
theory of harsh implementation or punitive conditions.
169
 The ability to 
have the courts engage in a meaningful inquiry into the treatment on 
which SVPs‘ confinement is largely based detracts from the potential 
argument that treatment is being unlawfully withheld.  
Abandoning the professional judgment standard would also promote 
the release of individuals who may have been erroneously confined under 
the statute.
170
 It is likely that at least some of the individuals confined 
under these schemes do not actually fit the statutory definition because the 
predictions about future dangerousness during the commitment 
proceedings are not very reliable,
171
 states can engage in expert shopping 
to obtain a commitment,
172
 and juries are understandably prone to 
commit.
173
 The professional judgment standard is currently a major 
impediment to receiving more treatment or establishing that the conditions 
of confinement are incompatible with a state‘s goal of treatment. If it were 
removed, then perhaps some individuals at the margins could be 
rehabilitated and released.  
For individuals who clearly fall within the statutory definition, it is 
unlikely that providing them with a way to obtain more treatment or more 
therapeutic conditions would result in their release. Even in the more 
successful state treatment programs, the number of individuals who 
complete treatment and are released from confinement is fairly low.
174
 
Furthermore, it is far from clear that SVPs are a homogenous group who 
are all amenable to treatment.
175
 Providing additional treatment to 
 
 
 169. See supra notes 117–19. 
 170. See supra notes 36, 48 and accompanying text; see also Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 
(―Sex offenders selected for commitment are not always the most violent.‖). 
 171. See supra notes 36, 48. 
 172. See supra note 36. 
 173. See supra note 48. 
 174. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (―[O]nly a small fraction of committed offenders have 
ever completed treatment to the point where they could be released free and clear.‖). 
 175. See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 1 (―‗The population that is being detained is a very, 
very mixed group,‘ said Richard Wollert, a psychologist in Portland, Ore., who evaluates civilly 
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individuals for whom no effective treatment is currently available would 
present a very low risk of releasing dangerous individuals, but it would 
add to the moral
176
 and constitutional validity of the statute. Some may 
feel that providing more treatment to SVPs (many of whom may be 
effectively untreatable)
177
 is a costly
178
 and futile endeavor. Because it is 
difficult to predict who is amenable to treatment,
179
 providing uniformly 
mediocre treatment to all SVPs is unfair to those SVPs who might have a 
chance at release if they were given adequate treatment. In short, if 
legislatures wish to further the laudable goal of public safety through 
indefinite civil commitments, then quality treatment for all SVPs may be 
the cost. 
In lieu of the professional judgment standard, which presumes the 
validity of administrators‘ decisions while largely ignoring the overall 
conditions, courts might adopt a multi-factor test that considers the factual 
conditions of the challenged confinement. Rather than looking only to 
whether the decision substantially departs from general practice,
180
 a 
multi-factor test would allow the court to view the treatment decisions as 
they relate to the scheme as a whole. Such a test would suggest that when 
courts are evaluating the treatment decisions of administrators of 
involuntary civil commitment programs, courts may consider such factors 
as the treatment program‘s effectiveness relative to similar states‘ 
programs, whether the chosen treatment decisions are supported by 
research, whether there has been a history of abuse or improper 
implementation of the scheme in that state, the variety of treatment options 
made available at the facility, and the guidelines or standards of reputable 
professional organizations. These factors, which were extrapolated from 
some of the perceived problems in the relevant Supreme Court cases, are 
meant to serve as a starting point for further consideration, not as an 
exhaustive list.  
 
 
committed offenders.‖). Compare Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 388 (―Kansas, and supporting 
amici [from the ATSA and APA], argue that pedophilia is treatable.‖), with DeClue, supra note 44, at 
204 (―‗The situation is even worse with respect to rapists in particular. There is simply no convincing 
evidence that treatment has ever caused rapists to desist or even to reduce their offending behavior.‘‖ 
(citing M.L. LALUMIÈRE ET AL., THE CAUSES OF RAPE: UNDERSTANDING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
IN MALE PROPENSITY FOR SEXUAL AGGRESSION 188 (2005))). 
 176. For a moral argument in favor of treatment, see Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality 
and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET. SOUND L. REV. 709 
(1992). 
 177. See supra note 36. 
 178. See supra notes 163, 164. 
 179. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 135–42 and accompanying text. 
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The advantages of a multi-factor test over the professional judgment 
standard are evident through the analysis of a hypothetical example. 
Suppose a habitual sex offender, John, was found to be a sexually violent 
predator and civilly committed to a state facility for care and treatment. 
Suppose also that the statute under which John was committed does not 
provide any useful guidance as to what treatment he is entitled to receive. 
The facility that John was committed to operates in the following way: (1) 
biweekly group therapy is the only form of treatment offered, (2) none of 
the facility‘s SVPs have ever successfully completed the program and 
been released, and (3) the facility conducts regular strip searches of all 
SVPs. Suppose further that available research suggests that group therapy 
is significantly more effective when coupled with other forms of 
treatment, similar programs in other states occasionally release individuals 
following completion of their programs, and the Hypothetical 
Psychologists Association (HPA) generally regards the use of strip 
searches for sexual offenders as counterproductive to treatment goals.  
If John were to challenge the adequacy of the treatment at his facility, 
the court would be very likely to find that the treatment decisions are valid 
under the professional judgment standard. In applying the professional 
judgment standard, the court would first ask if the treatment decision was 
made by a professional, and then ask if it was a ―substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.‖181 Because 
the standard presumes the validity of the treatment decision, it is John‘s 
burden to show a substantial departure from the norms. It would be 
difficult for John to even show what the accepted practice or standard is,
182
 
let alone establish that biweekly group therapy sessions are a substantial 
departure from it. It appears highly likely that the presumed validity would 
remain undisturbed and the court would find John‘s challenge 
unpersuasive. 
John would have a much better chance of success if the court evaluated 
his challenge under a multi-factor test, such as the one previously 
suggested. Under a multi-factor test, the court would consider that the 
treatment program has never successfully treated and released an 
individual, although some similar states‘ programs have experienced some 
success. The court would also consider research that suggests that group 
therapy alone is significantly less effective than when it is combined with 
other types of therapy. Any history of abuse at the facility, such as 
 
 
 181. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982). 
 182. See supra notes 135–42. 
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noncompliance with injunctions, would also be a valid consideration. The 
singular nature of treatment options, especially if other treatments were 
available and feasible, would influence the court‘s determination. Finally, 
the court could weigh the administrators‘ decision to conduct regular strip 
searches against the HPA‘s general admonishment of this practice for sex 
offenders. Under this approach, John would enjoy a substantially better 
chance of successfully challenging the sufficiency of his treatment. At the 
very least, his substantive complaints about the treatment would be heard 
and evaluated rather than silenced by a presumption of validity. 
Furthermore, the multi-factor approach places the protection of John‘s 
rights in the able hands of the court, rather than abdicating this complex 
determination to the administrators of the facility. Although a state 
administrator may be an expert for the purposes of prescribing a treatment 
regimen, the proper expert for determining whether that treatment lives up 
to statutory and constitutional obligations is the court, not a state 
administrator.
183
 Adopting a different standard for evaluating SVPs‘ 
challenges to the sufficiency of their treatment, therefore, is a desirable 
solution that deserves further consideration. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sexually violent predator statutes serve the important function of 
protecting society from a class of highly dangerous individuals. These 
statutes occupy a tenuous constitutional position because they impose 
additional confinement after a convict‘s criminal sentence has been served. 
Critical to the constitutional validity of these statutes is the provision of 
treatment. As a matter of statute—and perhaps as a matter of federal 
constitutional law as well—SVPs have a right to treatment. But, in the 
relatively new and uncertain field of sexually violent predators, it is 
difficult to ascertain what is specifically included in this right to treatment. 
Hendricks vividly illustrated that the courts will afford state administrators 
a large degree of deference regarding treatment decisions under the 
 
 
 183. This is precisely the logic that the Ninth Circuit used in determining that state administrators 
could not invoke the professional judgment standard as to whether or not they were complying with an 
injunction. See Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2000) (―Appellants appear to suggest 
that because, in their capacities as mental health professionals, they believe they have complied with 
the legal requirements of the Turay Injunction and the Constitution in providing adequate mental 
health treatment, their decisions are beyond review. The district court correctly recognized that 
accepting such an argument would transfer the safeguarding of constitutional rights from the courts to 
mental health professionals.‖). 
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professional judgment standard, even in the face of evidence that 
―essentially no treatment‖ is being provided.184  
Although conventional wisdom would say that the statutory scheme is 
being protected by judicial deference, a closer look at the possible theories 
with which a litigant might challenge the statute reveals that the 
professional judgment standard could facilitate total invalidation of the 
statutory scheme. By allowing questionable treatment decisions to 
continue, the courts could be enabling the type of conditions or harsh 
implementation that members of the Supreme Court have suggested might 
lead to a finding that the statute is punitive and therefore invalid.
185
 In light 
of this dangerous possibility, it is an attractive option to abandon the 
professional judgment standard in favor of a multi-factor test that could 
curtail harsh implementation before it leads to an invalidation of the entire 
statutory scheme.  
David W. Nordsieck  
 
 
 184. See supra note 89. 
 185. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
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